THE POTAWATOMIIOKLAHOMA GAMING COMPACT OF 1992: HAVE TWO SOVEREIGNS ACHIEVED A MEETING OF THE MINDS?
Michael W. Ridgeway*
Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gaming activity.'
-from the Indian Gaming Regulatory Acte
L Introduction
With the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) in 1988, Congress provided the statutory framework for regulating gaming activities by Indians on Indian land. The Act cleared up some of the confusion and disagreement about the powers and duties of the various state and tribal governments. However, the IGRA has spawned some new areas of uncertainty. State-tribal relations are being tested, and settled issues of sovereignty may be thrown to the wind. This comment will first look at the IGRA in the abstract. Next, case law interpreting key sections of the IGRA will be examined. This will be followed by a reconstruction of the negotiation process which led to a gaming compact signed by the State of Oklahoma and the Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma. 3 The story of how these two sovereign governments negotiated toward a meeting of the minds illustrates how the IGRA can work in the real world.
The story of the Oklahoma-Potawatomi gaming compact also shows how the IGRA does not work in the real world. In Oklahoma, and perhaps other
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location as a tribal bingo operation. 6 Class II gaming also includes card games if the state in which a tribe is located approves of such games by statute." In addition, if the statutes are silent about card games, and the games are played anywhere in the state, they are considered class 11. " To some extent, the definition of class II gaming can vary from state to state, depending on local laws." However, the National Indian Gaming Regulatory Commission has refined class H's definition somewhat. If the activity involves gambling devices as defined by federal law," it cannot be class II gaming.' Class II gaming is generally regulated by the tribe. ' Class III gaming is defined as "all forms of gaming that are not class I gaming or class II gaming." ' This includes the traditional forms of gambling, such as casino games, pari-mutuel horse racing, and most electronic or mechanical games of chance. Before a tribe can operate such a venture on Indian land, it must reach an agreement with the state in which the land is situated.' The agreement, or "tribal-state compact," governs such things as regulation, operation, and taxation of -class III gaming activities. 6 The interaction and agreement between the state and the tribe will be the focus of this comment.
C. Tribal-State Gaming Compact: The Statutory Process
An Indian tribe does not need the state's permission to conduct class I or class II gaming on Indian land." Conversely, a tribe generally cannot conduct class M gaming without a tribal-state gaming compact.' The tribalstate compact is "the centerpiece of the IGRA's regulation of class III gaming." ' 29 The power of the states to resist such agreements is severely limited by the IGRA." The Act contains a strong bias in favor of tribes who 16 . Id.
Id.

19. The definition for class II gaining also includes a grandfather clause for specifically enumerated activities that were in effect prior to May 1, 1988, in Michigan, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington. Id. § 2703(7)(C). The act also recognizes the possibility of grandfathering other activities. Id. § 2703(7)(D), (E). When a tribe decides it wants to begin a class I gaming operation, it notifies the state that it wishes to enter into negotiations. The state is then required to "negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact."
Id. § 2710(b
32
If the state fails to respond to the tribe's request for negotiations," or if it attempts to directly tax the tribe or Indian lands as part of a gaming compact,' such action is evidence of bad faith. To encourage "good faith" negotiations, the IGRA contains relatively tight time restrictions. The Act allows a tribe to sue in federal court if an agreement has not been reached within 180 days of the tribe's request' The IGRA makes it easy for a tribe to make a prima facie case against a state. If the tribe shows that a compact has not been entered into and introduces any evidence that the state has not acted in good faith, the burden of proof shifts to the state.' The state is then required to prove that it has made a good faith effort to negotiate the gaming compact?'
The federal court can force the parties to the negotiating table and can order them to reach an agreement within sixty days.
8 If a tribal-state compact still has not been completed at the end of sixty days, the court can appoint a mediator of its choice." The state and the tribe each submit their final proposals to the mediator." The mediator chooses the proposed compact that best reflects the goals of the IGRA. 4 ' If the state agrees within sixty days to the proposal chosen by the mediator, the court action is resolved and the parties have a gaming compact. 42 If the state does not agree with the mediator's choice, the case goes to the Secretary of the Interior. At that point, the Secretary "shall prescribe, in consultation with the Indian tribe, procedures which are consistent with the proposed compact selected by the mediator." 43 After a gaming compact has been agreed to by negotiators for the tribe and the state, Oklahoma state law adds another step. As part of the state's approval process, the compact must have the blessing of both the governor and the state legislature's Joint Committee on State-Tribal Relations." After In addition, the tribe must pass an ordinance or resolution authorizing the gaming activities covered by the compact.' The ordinance may be passed either before negotiations, concurrent with approval of the agreement, or any other time during the process." The ordinance or resolution must be approved by the Chairman of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Commission"' and published in the Federal Register. 49 If the Chairman does not act within ninety days, the ordinance is considered to have been approved. ' Upon completion of the above steps, the approved compact is delivered to 58 how the costs of regulation will be paid, 59 who will enforce the law,' and so on. After the parties have decided that gaming will be allowed, they can get as creative as they wish. The body of federal Indian law does not necessarily apply, because sovereign rights can be created or waived by agreement."' If the parties are going to get hung up, it will most likely be at the beginning of the negotiations. Conflicts arise regarding what games will be allowed. The question hinges on the state's criminal law and public policy.' Does the state regulate games of chance or prohibit games of chance? Attempts to distinguish between civil-regulatory and criminal-prohibitory state policy began even before passage of the IGRA. The foundation for answering the regulatory-prohibitory question is the pre-IGRA case of California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.'
. Pre-IGRA decisions and decisions involving class 1I gaming often center on the applicability of the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1988). The ACA allows federal prosecution of certain state law violations that occur on Indian land. Class Ill gaming compacts can go beyond state law by allowing games on Indian land that are more tightly regulated on state land. Because such games would be conducted pursuant to an agreement with the state, an exception to state law is created. Therefore, it is unlikely that the ACA will often apply to class III gaming.
62. 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (1988).
48( U.S. 202 (1987).
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In Cabazon, the Indians operated bingo and card game operations on tribal land. California law limited bingo to certain charitable organizations and capped prizes at a maximum of $250 per game. The State of California attempted to prohibit the tribal games or at least impose its statutory limitations on the tribes. The United States Supreme Court held that tribes may conduct gaming operations free of state regulation in states which regulate, but do not prohibit, gaming.'
The Court discussed why California could not prohibit activities on Indian land that were regulated on state land:
California does not prohibit all forms of gambling. California itself operates a state lottery, and daily encourages its citizens to participate in this state-run gambling. California also permits parimutuel horse-race betting. Although certain enumerated gambling games are prohibited . . . . games not enumerated, including the card games played in the Cabazon card club, are permissible. . . . In light of the fact that California permits a substantial amount of gambling activity, including bingo, and actually promotes gambling through its state lottery, we must conclude that California regulates rather than prohibits gambling in general and bingo in particular.
The Court also explained why a state could not impose its regulations on tribal gaming activities. The federal government has a strong interest in encouraging tribal economic development.' The interests of tribes parallel that of the federal government, and bingo and other gaming provides a major source of revenue for tribes.' State regulation of tribal gaming would infringe upon a tribe's sovereign powers.
The Supreme Court's decision in Cabazon was handed down just six days after the IGRA was introduced.' Congress made it clear that the reasoning from Cabazon should apply to the IGRA. The Senate Report on the bill specifically recognized Cabazon as defining the distinction between state laws which prohibit an activity and laws which regulate permissible activities. The court grandfathered the tribe's venture into class II, but its reasoning regarding state law is relevant to class III as well. The court pointed out that the IGRA's legislative history embraces the rationale of Cabazon 3 In order to determine the effect of state law on the tribe's card games, the court examined whether South Dakota's gaming laws were regulatory or prohibitory. 4 Because South Dakota allowed bingo, horse and dog race betting, certain card games, and other forms of gambling, the state's policy could not be considered prohibitory." The court stated that the tribe had fulfilled the IGRA's requirement that gaming be "located within a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization or entity .... Because of the Cabazon rule, the State of South Dakota was not allowed to extend i'ts betting limits to a regulated activity conducted on Indian land."
States may want to limit tribal-state gaming compacts to games which are approved of by the state. In Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 78 the State believed that certain games were not proper subjects for a gaming compact. The State refused to negotiate, and the Tribe sued for failure to bargain in good faith. The court ordered Wisconsin to negotiate with the Tribe for the games in question, 7 Again, the court followed Cabazon in reasoning that the "issue is not whether the state has given express approval to the playing of a particular game, but whether Wisconsin's public policy toward class III gaming is prohibitory or regulatory." ' The court discussed the gaming activities that the state allowed: promotional sweepstakes, bingo, lotteries, and pari-mutuel betting.' Because the State regulated some activities that involved the elements of prize, chance and consideration, it did not have a public policy against class M[ gaming in general." Wisconsin's policy was regulatory, not prohibitory."
Wisconsin argued that even if its policy toward class III gaming was regulatory, it should not be required to negotiate games which it did not On May 1, the U.S. Attorneys for the Northern, Eastern and Western Districts of the State of Oklahoma told Mr. Nance that they had some questions about the legality of bringing the VLTs into Oklahoma."
6 Their concern was with the Johnson Act," 7 a federal law which prohibits shipment of gambling devices into a state which outlaws them."' On May 8, Mr. Nance and Mr. Minnis agreed that a demonstration would not be necessary."1 9 Although the U.S. Attorneys had expressed concern about the legality of bringing VLTs into Oklahoma, negotiations with the Potawatomis continued to move forward." The State and the Potawatomis believed that a compact between the two sovereigns would take care of any questions of legality. On May 14, Mr. Minnis sent a revised draft of the earlier proposal, specifying VLTs as the proposed gaming activity.
On On June 3, Mr. Nance met with Mr. Minnis and passed along the gravity of the U.S. Attorney's verbal warning." z It appeared that the previous negotiations might be all for naught. The State did not want to enter into an agreement that violated federal law.' Mr. Minnis proposed that they continue negotiations, with the Tribe offering to indemnify and hold harmless the State.
7 Mr. Nance agreed and asked for a clause which specifically mentioned concerns about the Johnson Act." On June 10, Mr. Minnis handdelivered the requested amendments to Mr. Nance." On July 2, a few more minor changes were made, and a revised final draft was distributed to the parties.' On July 6, 1992, the Business Committee of the Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma unanimously approved the compact, and it was signed by the Tribe's Chairman and its Secretary/Treasurer. 37 On July 10, the compact was signed by Governor 
B. Contents of the Potawatomi-Oklahoma Gaming Compact
The compact begins with a resolution which sets out the rights and desires of the parties. 4 ' This is followed by definitions, findings, and declarations of policy that closely mirror those in the IGRA."' The parties agreed on a three-year automatically renewable term. ' The State is given the right to inspect the premises, machines, and records of the Tribe's gaming operation.
TM The Tribe is also required to provide equipment for the State to remotely monitor all VLTs." 45 Various other specifications for the VLTs are enumerated." The subjects of accounting and auditing and employment security are detailed.
The Tribe agrees to pay the costs of the compact, including a $5000 payment to reimburse the State for negotiating costs.' The Tribe established an escrow account to pay future expenses of the State. 4 The compact concedes that the VLTs are gambling devices as defined by the Johnson Act."
5 It acknowledges that all three of the U.S. Attorneys in Oklahoma believe that importation of VLTs would violate federal law.' The compact contains a detailed discussion of the Johnson Act problem and a procedure for testing the legality of the VLTs.
First, the Potawatomis agree to "defend, indemnify and hold harmless Oklahoma from any liability arising to Oklahoma from the importation of the as Exhibit A to executed Potawatomi-Oklahoma Gaming Compact, supra note 3).
138. Potawatomi-Oklahoma Gaming Compact, supra note 3, at 12. The State was reluctant to enter into a compact for an activity which could be illegal. This clause shifted the burden for defending the legality of video lottery terminals to the Tribe.
However, post-importation defense is not the only burden the Tribe agreed to accept. The Potawatomis also agreed to follow a three-step procedure for assuring the legality of VLTs before beginning gaming operations.'" The first step is an attempt to obtain written permission. If the Potawatomis obtain permission from the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Oklahoma, they may bring the machines into the state.' 5 If permission cannot be obtained from the U.S. Attorney, the second step is for the Tribe to seek a declaratory judgment that importation of the machines does not violate the Johnson Act.'
5 Unlike the preceding provision, the declaratory judgment provision does not specify where the action must be filed. It merely requires that a "federal court of competent jurisdiction" decide whether importation of VLTs violates the Johnson Act.'" If the federal court rules in the Tribe's favor, they may begin gaming operations.'
58
If the federal court rules against the Tribe, presumably the decision would be appealed to the Tenth Circuit. If the federal court dismisses the declaratory judgment action without a decision on the merits, the compact provides a third step for testing the legality of importing VLTs.
The third step is a test, or direct challenge, to the threat of prosecution. The Tribe can import up to ten VLTs, simultaneously notifying the appropriate U.S. Attorney in writing of the action.'
59 If the U.S. Attorney takes no action within thirty days, the State agrees to allow the Tribe to import as many VLTs as it desires, at the Tribe's risk.'"
The compact is accompanied by exhibits which describe the VLTs in detail, as well as regulations for technical specifications.'
C. Concurrent Negotiations: A State's Duty to Negotiate in Good Faith
When the various tribes were informed that video lottery terminals might violate the Johnson Act, they did not all react in the same way. As seen above, the Potawatomi Tribe dealt with the problem head-on by acknowledg- The suit did not make it to court-ordered mediation, nor were the merits of the Poncas' bad faith claim ever heard. On September 8, 1992, Chief Judge Ralph Thompson held in Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma"s that it was unconstitutional for Congress to require a state, against its will, to enter into an agreement with a tribe regarding gambling activities on tribal land within the state.
Because the goal of the Ponca Tribe's suit was to try to force Oklahoma into an agreement, Judge Thompson dismissed it.
The decision was founded upon the Tenth Amendment and Eleventh Amendment. The Tenth Amendment reserves powers to the states that are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution." The court recognized that Congress can encourage the states to adopt legislation that conforms to federal interests." However, it drew a distinction at federal attempts to force state regulation.' 67 The possibility exists that a state could be compelled to enter a compact against the state's wishes. Thus, a state would be forced into regulating gaming within its borders."~ "A critical alternative is missing in the IGRA -a State may not simply decline to regulate Class m1 gaming; it does not have the option of refusing to act."'" Therefore, the court said that the IGRA creates an unconstitutional interference with the state's sovereign contracting powers under the Tenth Amendment. The IGRA gave tribes a statutory sword that could be used to push states to the negotiating table. The district court's decision in Ponca takes that sword away and shifts the balance of power to the state. The ruling has sent ripples of uncertainty into the legal community." The Ponca Tribe has appealed the decision,' and the case is currently pending before the Tenth Circuit.'
79
IV. Problems with Tribal-State Gaming Compacts
The Oklahoma experience illustrates two serious problems with the IGRA. First, if the Johnson Act prohibits importation of machines that are the subject of the gaming compact, the Potawatomi agreement is worthless. The State represented that video lottery terminals would be acceptable, and the Tribe negotiated with the intent of setting up a VLT gaming operation. If the Johnson Act is applicable, the equipment cannot be imported, possessed, or used in Indian country. 18 0 Second, if the Ponca decision is affirmed on appeal, the negotiating power of the tribes will be far less than Congress intended. Tribes who want to conduct gaming activities will be limited to negotiating for what the state wants to allow. In effect, states will be able to impose their laws and regulations in Indian country. Each of these problems is discussed below. exclusive control over Indian land. In effect, the states have been given a very loud voice on the council of any tribe that wants to conduct gaming activities.
The increased state influence over Indian country has been balanced by giving tribes the power to force good faith negotiations. The IGRA encourages gaming operations on Indian land by pushing the parties toward the negotiating table. If the state refuses to negotiate in good faith, a tribe can exercise its sovereign powers through the "cram down" provision of the IGRA.
4
In Oklahoma, the process that led to the Potawatomi gaming compact has been an eye-opener. It illustrates how the compact negotiation process can work and shows how it can break down. It also sets the stage for what games will be negotiable in the future.
Meanwhile, the Ponca Tribe's appeal to the Tenth Circuit will help determine how much power the respective parties will have in future negotiations. If the court affirms state sovereignty over Congress' purpose in passing the IGRA, the power of tribes to negotiate meaningful compacts will be gutted. States will be able to impose state rules on Indian land with little fear of repercussions.
The Tenth Circuit should recognize the shallowness of the State's Tenth Amendment and Eleventh Amendment claims. The Court should follow the well-established rule that Indians have sovereignty over their own land. The court should force the State back to the negotiating table to conclude an agreement which reflects state, tribal, and federal interests.
V. Conclusion
The Potawatomi-Oklahoma gaming compact illustrates legal issues that will have far-reaching effects in the field of Indian law. The applicability of the Johnson Act to devices destined for a legal Indian gaming facility is a roadblock that gaming opponents can use to strengthen state regulation of Indian country. Undoubtedly, the question is destined for the Supreme Court.
The Court will also be faced with whether states may use the Tenth Amendment and Eleventh Amendment as justification for walking away from negotiations with tribes who wish to enter into gaming compacts. Until the high court gives some firm, unambiguous guidance, tribal gaming is unlikely to become a reality in Oklahoma.
